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Introduction 
Before he assumed command of United Nations (UN) forces in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in January 1995, General Rupert Smith, on different occa-
sions and before various audiences, presented his views on the "object and 
utility of the use of force in intervention operations" afterthe Cold War. 
The central question he raised was why the threat of and the actual use of 
force had often ended "with disappointing or unlooked for conse-
quences".' A basic reason, he suggested, was that "we had been unclear 
as to what it is we expect the use of force or forces to achieve as opposed 
to do."2 This study questions whether governments and international 
organisations have properly grasped this fundamental distinction and the 
consequences that flow from it. 
The article is concerned with the use of force in "peace operations" in 
the decade of the 1990s. As a category, "peace operations" has become a 
catch-all phrase, where the term "peace" or "peace support" has less to do 
with the operational environment and the specific challenge it poses to an 
intervening force, than with the wider objective which, it is hoped, military 
action will help to promote.' These operations are, ultimately, about 
righting wrongs and advancing wider humanitarian purposes. As such, 
they are supposed to transcend the pursuit of narrowly defined interests 
and national ambitions. Thus, the second UN Mission to Somalia 
(UNOSOM 11) was deployed in May 1993 to assist "the Somali people in 
rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life".4. NATO 
and UN military action in Bosnia in late August and early September 1995 
were designed to prevent further "ethnic cleansing".' Both these cases 
involved what, according to many, ought properly to be considered a 
distinctive sub-category of peace operations, namely "peace enforce-
ment".lt is this category and its supposed utility, both as an analytical 
construct and as a key to understanding how force has in fact been used 
in the I 990s, that provide the main focus for this article. 
The view that "peace enforcement" constitutes a type of military 
activity that, whilst "coercive in nature", remains distinct from "war", has 
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been embraced by the armed forces of several countries, all of them 
understandably anxious to provide appropriate doctrine or guiding ·princi-
ples for their armed forces engaged in a growing number of.international 
operations.' While different names have sometimes been used- French 
doctrine staff, for example, speak of "peace restoration" operations· 
(restauration de la paix) - the basic idea of "peace enforcement" rests on 
two key assumptions.' The first of these is that military force, even 
though it involves coercion, can be used impartially to ensure compliance 
with a given mandate without designating an enemy. According to extant 
United Kingdom doctrine, Peace Support Operations (PSO) operations 
"are neither in support of, nor against, a particular party, but are designed 
to restore peace and ensure compliance with the mandate in an even-
handed manner".' John Ruggie has expressed the same basic idea, arguing 
that force can be "used impartially, meaning without a priori prejudice or 
bias in response to violations of agreements; Security Council mandates, 
or norms stipulated in some other fashion".' The second assumption flows 
directly from the first: using force in this manner, precisely because it is 
"impartial and even-handed", will not prejudice the political outcome of the 
conflict in question. 
There is something superficially appealing about this approach and 
much of the doctrine literature where it is elaborated is sophisticated and 
undoubtedly valuable as a means of instilling a "peace operations" -mindset 
among soldiers, especially among those whose traditional focus has been 
on high-intensity warfare. Yet, the necessarily abstract and generalised 
character of this literature has certain striking limitations when it comes to 
understanding how military force has in fact been employed in support of 
humanitarian objectives over the past decade. Humanitarian or moral 
imperatives have clearly assumed a more promin.ent role in the minds of 
policy-makers, but decisions regarding the use force and, above all, the 
manner in which force has actually been employed, have also been shaped 
by a range of other motivations and constraints. These have incl4ded 
considerations of prestige and credibility; competing perceptions of 
national interest; historical memories and fears; bureaucratic politics; and, 
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not least, the particular outlook and personalities of key decision-makers. 
These sorts of influences, whilst often difficult to quantify, have always 
been present when governments make decisions about the use of military 
force. Other factors, notably the aversion to casualties and the unique 
pressures of modern media, are arguably more specific to the post Cold-
War era. These have also influenced both the character and pattern of 
interventions in important ways. 10 The experience of "peace operations" 
cannot be dissected for "lessons" without an awareness of these wider 
considerations. And while doctrine and doctrinal revision have a role to 
play, the more urgent need is for political decision-makers to rethink, on 
the basis of what is now a significant body of experience, the require-
ments for the effective use of force, that is, to think of military force in 
terms of what it can achieve as opposed to what it can do. 
The Use of Force in Somalia and Bosnia: Argument In 
Brief 
To this end, this article concentrates specifically on developments and 
decisions regarding the use of force taken during the critical period of two 
operations: UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The 
former case involved American troops, nominally as part of a larger UN 
operation, in the impoverished and war-stricken country of Somalia in the 
summer and autumn of 1993. During a five month period, American 
forces were used in a "peace enforcement" capacity against forces loyal 
to Mohammed Farah Aydeed, an armed faction leader or "war lord" whose 
physical capture the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, had 
persuaded the American administration, was critical to the success of 
largest UN operation to date. The second case examined covers the 
military action and, significantly, the background to it, by NATO and the 
UN in late August and early September I 995 against Bosnian Serb forces 
throughout Bosnia; an action which helped pave the way for a permanent 
cease-fire among the warring factions after four years of bloody and 
brutal fighting. 
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One reason for re-visiting these cases is that the "international commu-
nity" is still very much living with the consequences of the actions that 
were taken in each case. American policy towards peace operatiOns 
generally, and the UN and Africa in particular, remain profoundly shaped 
by the events in Somalia. In Bosnia, military action in August and Septe~­
ber 1995 helped create the conditions for a peace settlement to be negoti-
ated in Dayton; a settlement which remains in place, even though the 
country has increasingly assumed the character of a trusteeship with 
limited signs of genuine integration among its constituent parts. The 
background to "Operation Deliberate Force" in 1995 is also of interest for 
another reason. The decision by NATO leaders to launch an air campaign 
against Yugoslavia in March I 999 and the associated belief that ~ "short, 
sharp, shock" against the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic would 
do the trick, were based on a particular and, as will be argued more fully, 
incomplete and simplistic reading of unfolding events in I 995. 
There are two further reasons, however, why these cases deserve to 
be examined together. First, in each case, the use of force was tied to the 
promotion of a broader humanitarian objective. As such, they both reflect 
a trend whereby the use of military force internationally has increasingly 
come to be justified on humanitarian grounds. As indicated above, this is 
not to suggest that in either Somalia or Bosnia other motives did not 
influence the calculations of decision-makers and helped spur them into 
action.ll Nor is it to suggest that there was complete convergence of 
views among states about the need for enforcement action to be taken. 
Yet, while it is true that Chapter VII of the UN Charter, concerned with 
the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, was 
invoked as a legal basis for military action in each case, these were not 
Chapter VII actions along the lines of the Gulf War. In 1990-91, a broad 
and unlikely coalition of states rallied behind the Security Council's deci-
sion to reverse, if necessary by use of force, the entirely unambiguous 
case of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. By contrast, in Somalia, Bosnia and 
later in Kosovo, an intolerable situation, involving suffering and human 
rights violations on a scale offending the "moral conscience of mankind", 
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was deemed to have arisen within a country, and Chapter VII was used, in 
part, as a procedural device enabling "tougher action" to be taken. 
The second reason for investigating these two cases together is that 
the level of force employed in both cases was designed to impose a 
solution or force an outcome by coercive means. The decision to take 
such action arose out of a conviction that relying on the consent and good 
will of the parties would only prolong an unacceptable situation. Indeed, 
disillusionment with consent-based peacekeeping, where the use of force 
had been restricted to self-defence (albeit with some variations in the 
interpretation of what constituted self-defence), provided an important 
backdrop to the decision to use force. 
It is necessary to stress what this article does not address. It does not 
cover the contentious issue of the legitimacy of military action in each 
case. It does recognise, however, that while the record of humanitarian 
action in the conflicts of the 1990s is uneven, and that the principle of 
humanitarian intervention itself has been applied with conspicuous incon-
sistency, a significant change in the normative climate has taken place. 12 
Specifically, the view that what happens within a country should not be a 
matter of international concern has lost some of its force, or rather, has 
been tempered by countervailing pressures at least to consider intervention 
in circumstances involving human rights violations on a "massive" scale. 
The chief concern here is about the actual use of force in support of 
humanitarian objectives. In brief, the argument put forward is not that 
enforcement should be ruled out as an option for decision-makers, but 
rather that the military and political consequences that inevitably flow from. 
such action need to be carefully considered and not simply wished away. 
In its political and military consequences, enforcement cannot be impartial. 
As with the decision to commit military forces historically, enforcement 
action in support of humanitarian objectives requires tough and difficult 
choices; choices that some of the doctrinal literature on "peace opera-
tions" in the West, if only inadvertently, has tended to underplay. 
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1. The Lessons from Somalia, 1993 
In January 1991, after more than twenty years in power, President 
Siad Barre was forced to flee Somalia after a protracted and highly 
destructive period of civil war. Barre, an autocratic and ruthless ruler 
who had come to power in a military coup in 1969, left behind a 
depressing legacy of disintegrating institutions and economic misman-
agement on a grand scale. His desperate attempt to hold on to power in 
the late 1980s resulted in a brutal civil war against an alliance of clan-
based factions whose one common purpose was the ouster of the 
hated dictator. Partly for this reason, Barre's removal only hastened the 
collapse of the Somali State as factions, previously allied against him, 
were unable to agree on the basis for a new political order. The result 
was a profound "crisis of legitimate authority" . .1 3 In the summer of 
1992, fierce rivalry and intense fighting between the two main factions 
of the United Somali Congress led by Mohammed Farah Aydeed and Ali 
Mahdi Mohammed respectively, thwarted the efforts of a small-scale 
UN mission (UNOSOM I) to supervise the delivery of relief supplies to 
the country. 14 It was against the background of these developments - a 
collapsed state, continued fighting, and a large-scale famine - that 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, asked the United States in late 1992 to lead a 
military task force (UNITAF) to Somalia that would secure humanitar-
ian relief operations and, at the same time, prepare the ground for a 
second and much larger UN mission (UNOSOM II). The continuing 
precariousness of the situation in the country in early 1993 was deem-
ed to require a more forceful mandate for any follow-on force. Conse-
quently, the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) 
was "endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter" and became, in the words of the Boutros-Ghali, the "first 
operation of its kind to be authorised by the international commu-
nity".15 
Presenting his plans to the Security Council in March 1993, the 
Secretary-General envisaged a role for UNOSOM II that il)volved far 
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more than simply the continuation of UNITAF's efforts to establish "a 
secure environment for humanitarian assistance". 16 Indeed, Boutros-
Ghali called for a mandate that: 
would also empower UNOSOM ll to provide assistance to the Somali 
people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political 
life, re-establishing the countryS constitutidnal structure; achieving 
national reconciliation, [and] recreating a Somali state based on 
democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and 
infrastructure. 17 
Legitimate questions have been raised about the appropriateness of adopt-
ing such an ambitious mandate given the nature of the crisis in Somalia at 
the time. In particular, the emphasis on recreating a Somali State has been 
viewed by prominent some scholars, as well as by some experienced NGOs, 
as running counter to "powerful economic and social forces in contempo-
rary Somalia militating against any central or centralizing political arrange-
ment"." Mark Bradbury of OXFAM, writing in 1994, pointed out that 
"centralised government is the very thing that many Somalis have been 
fighting against" .19 A related criticism centred on the failure by outsiders to 
take proper account of the "cultural specifics of the Somali context"."' 
Yet, as Menkhaus also perceptively notes, while the various critiques of 
the UN's approach to reconciliation in Somalia "grew louder and more 
caustic" as the situation deteriorated in 1993, "collectively ... they often 
contradicted rather than reinforced each other". 21 What is surely beyond 
dispute is that the general nature of the objectives spelled out by the UN in 
March 1993 could only be achieved with the support and involvement of 
the Somalis themselves. This meant, as far as the central focus of this 
article is concerned, that military operations would have to be subordi-
nated to and closely co-ordinated with political efforts to control violence 
and set the country on the path of reconciliation. In the event, American-
led military actions from early June 1993 onwards, actively encouraged by 
Boutros-Ghali himself, were to have the very opposite effect. Still, even as 
10 
the situation on the ground deteriorated in the summer of 1993, UN and 
US officials continued to maintain that they were not in Somalia to fight a 
"war", and that actions were not directed against any one party as such. It 
was a "peace enforcement" operation with Chapter VII powers and the 
mission was not to fight an "enemy" but to ensure that Security Council 
orders were implemented. That, at any rate, was the theory. 
Shortly after the killing of 24 Pakistani UN peacekeepers on 5 June 
1993, the Security Council passed a resolution condemning what it 
described as "premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently 
belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA)".22 A Commission of 
Inquiry, set up by the UN to investigate the circumstances that had led to 
the deaths of its personnel, concluded much later that "in the absence of a 
more convincing explanation from the USC/SNA", it believed that the SNA 
had indeed "orchestrated the attacks" on 5 June." It could find no "con-
clusive evidence", however, to support the view that the attacks had been 
"pre-planned and pre-meditated"." Encouraged by Boutros-Ghali, Security 
Council Resolution 837 was nevertheless interpreted by the US leadership 
in Mogadishu as requiring a significant escalation in the use of force, 
including the targeting of the senior hierarchy of the SNA.25 While pro-
fessedly still not taking sides in the wider Somali conflict, a new phase of 
operations began on 12 June 1993 with a series of night and day-time 
attacks by American forces of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) aimed at 
destroying weapons sites and Radio Mogadishu controlled by forces loyal 
to Aydeed. Within weeks, Jonathan Howe, Boutros-Ghali's American 
Special Representative in Somalia, had also announced a$ 25,000 bounty 
for the capture of Aydeed who was increasingly described as an obstruc-
tionist warlord. 
The key issue here is not whether Aydeed could or should have been 
more unambiguously linked to the attack on UN forces; indeed he already 
had more than enough blood on his hands. The real question was whether 
the strategy adopted in response to that attack was the wisest policy under 
the circumstances. The Commission of Inquiry, whose final report 
Boutros-Ghali initially sought to suppress, noted laconically that it was 
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"arguable whether Resolution 837 really envisaged the bombing of houses, 
garages and meetings."" In particular, the Commission singled out, as 
have most accounts of UNOSOM IT's history, the decision to attack the 
house of Abdi Hassan Awale on 12 July 1993. Awale's house was de-
scribed at the time as a "major SNN Ay deed militia command and control 
centre" but on the day of the attack, it was serving as a meeting place for 
elders, clansmen, intellectuals and militia leaders. The aim of the "Abdi 
House" attack was to "eliminate the SNA command centre and its occu-
pants"·" To this end, and in order to preserve the element of surprise, US 
forces abandoned the policy of prior notification before an attack which 
had been practised hitherto in an attempt to minimise collateral damage. In 
a carefully researched and graphic account of US military operations in 
Mogadishu, Mark Bowden has described how on that day, sixteen TOW 
missiles slammed into a meeting of unsuspecting clan elders and religious 
leaders." The attack was estimated by the International Red Cross to have 
killed more than 50 Somalis and injured a further 170. According to 
Bowden, "among the elders present at the meeting were religious leaders, 
former judges, professors, the poet Moallim Soyan, and the clan's most 
senior leader, Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden"." The attack, for which 
President Bill Clinton's specific approval had been sought,30 did "more than 
any single act to stir up local support for Aydeed and the Habr Gidr, and 
turned many moderate Somalis who had supported the intervention against 
the international mission."" The Commission of Inquiry rightly concluded 
that after the 5 June incident, and more unambiguously so after 12 July, 
the UN had become involved in what amounted to a war against Aydeed's 
SNA in Mogadishu. Its report perceptively added that "presumably the 
war, when it started, followed its own dynamics". The climax was 
reached on 3-4 October 1993, when 18 American soldiers were killed and 
78 wounded in a fire fight which resulted in the death of possibly as many 
as 1000 Somali civilians. The Washington Post aptly described the depar-
ture of US troops from Somalia as a "guns-cocked withdrawal"." 
What, then, are the wider lessons from UNOSOM IT's involvement in 
Somalia between May and October 1993? The first and most obvious 
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lesson is that one cannot wage peace and make war in one location at the 
same time. As noted above, legitimate questions have been raised about the 
manner of the UN's involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s, especially 
its lack of sensitivity to and understanding of the political reality of Soma-
lia. This is not to suggest, however, that once UNOSOM IT deployed in 
the country in May 1993, the course of events was doomed to follow the 
disastrous path described above. Gerard Prunier has shown how French 
troops, although deployed in a "less tense" area of the country, were able 
to achieve a significant measure of stability and progress in their sector by 
adopting a "very minimal, close-to-the-ground, down-to-earth approach", 
in sharp contrast to American forces in and around Mogadishu." Like-
wise, Robert Patman in a comparative study of US and Australian policy in 
Somalia, argues persuasively that Australian soldiers were able to achieve 
an impressive amount in a short period of time (17 weeks) by adopting a 
radically different approach to that of US troops. Operating in the area 
around Baidoa- known as the "city of death" until Australian troops 
arrived - they "managed to create a stable situation ... where relief agen-
cies could freely operate and fulfil their work" .34 The key to the compara-
tive success of the Australian contingent, according to Patman, was 
similar to that of the French: a community-oriented style of operations, 
low-tech and participatory. These experiences suggest that there were 
certainly alternatives to the US mode of army operations. Yet it cannot be 
concluded from this that what happened in Somalia was simply a case of 
"peace enforcement" that went awry. 
"Peace enforcement" doctrine emphasises that force can be applied 
impartially if the focus of military action is firmly geared towards ensuring 
compliance with a given mandate. The difficulty with this is that all 
Security Council resolutions, without exception, reflect a measure of 
political compromise which in turn lends the mandate to differing interpre-
tations. In some cases, the nature of that compromise has involved the 
commitment to an operational "end state" so vague as to provide little or 
no basis for translation into realisable military objectives. The case of 
Somalia illustrates how the adoption, interpretation and evolution of a 
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mandate, including the question of the use of force, depend critically on 
the interplay of personalities, competing motivations and constraints of the 
kind alluded to above. Resolution 837 was rushed through the Council and 
left a number of questions about implementation unanswered. Boutros-
Ghali's personal commitment to the Somalia operation and his direct 
involvement in decision-making turned out to be critical to the course of 
events. His subsequent claim that he was "obliged" by the Security 
Council to take the actions that he did is anything but convincing. In his 
memoirs, Boutros-Ghali recalls how the aforementioned and critical Abdi 
House attack had in fact given rise to a "debate" about the way 
forward." Along with Madeleine Albright, he was convinced of the need to 
capture Aydeed and dismissed, then as he does in his memoirs, those who 
claimed to have "understood" the Somali people. These included the 
Italians (he regrets having brought them along in the first place); 
Mohamed Sahnoun (the highly capable UN Special Representative who he 
had first asked to undertake a fact-finding mission to the country in March 
1992); and senior officials within the UN Secretariat. In fact, Boutros-
Ghali 's own approach to the UN mission and specifically to the Ay deed 
coalition was fatally compromised by his previous involvement in the 
region as a senior Egyptian minister. Indeed, as Compagnon makes clear, 
in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boutros-Ghali was closely 
involved in support of Barre until the very end. This was always likely to 
colour his judgement about the "impartial application of force". It certainly 
influenced the attitudes and perceptions of Somalis. 
The call in such cases is, of course, for the Security Council itself to 
ensure greater clarity of mandates, and much ink has been spilt in the 
1990s by commissions of "eminent persons" stressing the need for "better 
mandates". While this objective is laudable, the adoption of Resolution 837 
provides grounds only for cautious optimism. A senior British diplomat 
involved in the informal Council deliberations preceding the adoption of 
this critical resolution, recalls how the British government expressed 
"some concern" about how it had been "rushed" without an adequate 
assessment of its implications on the ground. He noted, however, that 
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London's central preoccupation and interest at the time were with events 
in Bosnia, where it had just played a key role in the drawn-out and politi-
cally difficult process leading up to the adoption of Resolution 836, 
extending UNPROFOR's role in relation to the so-called "safe areas" in 
Bosnia. Given this hierarchy of priorities and the fact that the US and 
Pakistan were pushing hard for a quick response to events in Somalia, the 
British view, understandably, was that taking the lead in Somalia (or even 
just raising awkward questions about "the way forward" after Resolution 
837) was not in their "interest"." It belongs to the story that the American 
Permanent Representative to the UN at the time, Madeleine Albright, was 
pushing hard for an immediate and "tough" response in support of Paki-
stan, and that both these countries had spent much of the previous three 
months expressing frustration about what they considered to be French 
and British pusillanimity over Bosnia. Indeed, only two days earlier, 
Pakistan had abstained in voting on Resolution 836 extending the "safe 
areas" concept in Bosnia.37 The adoption of 837 on Somalia is not untypi-
cal of the kind of dynamics that often drive the process of mandate 
formulation in the UN Security Council. 
11. "Operation Deliberate Force" and the end of 
UNPROFOR's mission 
UNPROFOR's involvement in Bosnia came to an end with the signing of a 
comprehensive peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina at Dayton in 
late 1995." To many observers and policy-makers, it was the air campaign 
initiated by NATO against Bosnian Serb targets throughout the country in 
late August and early September 1995 (Operation Deliberate Force) and it 
alone, which "produced the results" that allowed agreement to be reached. 
This reading of the end-game in Bosnia has since been presented, and in 
many quarters accepted, as the central lesson for policy-makers regarding 
the use of force from that conflict. Indeed, it clearly informed the thinking 
of Western leaders and military planners in the run-up to Operation Allied 
Force, NATO's air campaign in Kosovo against the regime ofMilosevic in 




March 1999. In assuming, as was widely done, that the "short, sharp, 
shock" of a bombing campaign would quickly lead Milosevic to abandon 
his repressive policies in the province of Kosovo, Western leaders were 
looking to and citing as evidence in support of their chosen policy, the 
supposed effect of NATO's aerial bombardment in Bosnia.39 This is a 
crude and incomplete reading of what eventually brought the Serbs to the 
negotiating table and the war to an end. Drawing lessons regarding the use 
of force in "peace operations" from that experience requires examining the 
combined effect of four major developments which by, mid-August 1995, 
had created the conditions for the effective use of force to be initiated. 
These developments did not reflect a carefully co-ordinated strategic plan 
based on political consensus in capitals about the "way forward". Instead, 
they came about as a result of events on the ground; the willingness and 
ability of certain key actors to respond to those events; and, ultimately, by 
the American-led preparedness to support Croatia and take advantage of its 
military successes against Serb forces in both Croatia and Bosnia in 1995. 
The first major development was the weakening of the military position of 
the Bosnian Serhs. This, however, had been substantially achieved well 
before the air campaign was launched. The dramatic success of Croatia's 
military offensives, first in Western Slavonia (Sector West) in May 1995, 
and later in the Krajina in August, had profoundly altered the strategic 
predicament of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). The Croat offensives, 
actively supported and strongly encouraged by the US (and to a lesser but 
significant degree by Germany) and eventually resulting.in the single 
largest instance of forced population displacement in the brutal season of 
"ethnic cleansing" between 1991 and 1995, was one of the preconditions 
for the effective use of force in September. The full background to the 
Croat military successes involved the American decision to assist in the 
creation of a professional and combat capable force that could take on the 
Serbs (a process which started in the latter half of 1994).40 American 
involvement also entailed assistance in the planning of operations; encour-
aging the Croat leadership at critical moments to pursue the "military 
option"'41 and a readiness to accept, as distinct from condone, the more 
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than likely violations of human rights and reprisals that would inevitably 
follow as interior forces moved in and reasserted control over areas 
"liberated" by Croatia's "crack" combat brigades.42 The strategic signifi-
cance of Croat victories on the battlefield, however, was clear: it deci-
sively weakened the position of the Bosnian Serbs, both in terms of morale 
and strategic depth. The extent to which their position had been under-
mined became evident during the NATO air campaign a few weeks later 
when Bosnian Government and Croat forces (in theory, supposedly 
operating together) provided an effective land component to NATO's air 
campaign. 
The second development that facilitated the use of force in Bosnia was 
the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from isolated and exposed positions 
in Serb-controlled territory. Since the hostage crisis in May and June of 
1995, General Rupert Smith, commander of UN forces in Bosnia, had 
been working towards this goal in order to reduce the vulnerability of UN 
troops to further hostage-taking.43 Specifically, this involved the abandon-
ment of the Weapon Collection Points around Sarajevo and Gorazde, the 
only remaining "safe area" in eastern Bosnia after the fall, at terrible cost, 
of both Srebrenica and Zepa to Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. By late 
August, the process of concentrating forces away from exposed positions 
was nearly complete, with the significant exception of the remaining 
British troops in Gorazde. When a mortar round landed on the Markala 
market in Sarajevo on 28 August, General Smith, while seeking confirma-
tion that the mortar attack originated from a Bosnian Serb position, stalled 
for time to allow British troops to be extracted from the enclave, prepare 
for artillery bombardment of Serb positions around Sarajevo, and allow 
enough time for Admiral Leighton-Smith at NATO's southern command 
headquarters to prepare for a sustained air campaign. Once confirmation 
had been obtained and the other elements were in place, both commanders 
turned their "key". 44 
The third development facilitating the use of force, in addition to 
removing points of military vulnerability throughout Serb-controlled 
territory, was the creation by Britain, France and the Netherlands of a 
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Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) providing, for the first time, effective and 
accurate mortar and artillery support on Mount Igman near Sarajevo. This 
gave UN forces a capability that had hitherto been lacking to suppress Serb 
artillery positions around Sarajevo. When it was first announced that such 
a force would be deployed, it was unclear whether these reinforcements 
would be sent to assist a withdrawal or to help create the conditions for 
effective military action on the ground. At a meeting of senior UN officials, 
including the UN Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, General Bernard 
Janvier and General Rupert Smith, held in Split on 9 June 1995 to assess 
the situation after the hostage crisis, Smith wished to know whether "we 
[are] going to use them [RRF] to fight?- If not, I am not sure I want them 
- they will just be more mouths to feed, and create expectations that I 
cannot meet."" By August, however, the RRF artillery was in place around 
Sarajevo and was to play a key role in the unfolding campaign. When 
Operation Deliberate Force got underway, British and French artillery 
proved, especially in the initial stages of the campaign, to be more decisive 
in sustaining pressure on the Bosnian Serbs than NATO air power. The 
effectiveness of air power was hampered - not for the first, nor for the 
last time in the Balkans -by adverse weather conditions." The precise and 
sustained use of artillery in support of the air campaign allowed UNPROFOR 
to keep the roads around Sarajevo open; this, in spite of "concerns" ex-
pressed by senior UN officials in New York, even at this late stage, about 
"offensive actions" undertaken by the "peacekeepers" of UNPROFOR.47 
The final development which prepared the ground for effective use of 
force was the change in command and control arrangements for the use 
of NATO air power in support of UN forces that was made following the 
Srebrenica debacle. General Smith left the conference that had been 
convened in London in July 1995 to assess the "way forward" after the 
fall of Srebrenica and Zepa disillusioned about the lack of progress and the 
obvious divisions that persisted among major powers. However, steps 
were taken in early August to ensure more "timely and effective use of air 
power". These steps were enshrined in a memorandum of understanding 
between NATO and the UN, agreed between Admiral Leighton-Smith 
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(CINCSOUTH) and General Janvier (FC UNPF). The document included 
a more detailed description of operational considerations, including target-
ing and the conditions for initiation of operations. These conditions were 
now considered to include more than just direct attacks, and the decision 
to initiate operations was left to the "common judgement" of the senior 
NATO and UN commanders in theatre. 48 
Taken together, all of these developments meant that the ground was 
prepared for a deliberate transition to military enforcement action, which 
thus far had been consistently rejected by the Security Council and troop-
contributing countries. In the end, military force played a key role in 
bringing about a permanent cease-fire. This had involved, although re-
sisted by some within the UN hierarchy, a taking of sides and a willingness 
to engage in war-fighting to bring about a decisive result on the ground. In 
an essay accompanying the British Peace Support doctrine of 1997, the 
events of mid-1995 and Rupert Smith's role in them are described as a 
"switching to peace enforcement"." Clearly, this was not "peace enforce-
ment" of the kind which the doctrine itself set out to elaborate. 
Ill. A Doctrine for "Peace Enforcement"? 
Where does all of this leave the idea of peace enforcement as a form of 
"active impartiality" that somehow falls short of war? To raise the ques-
tion is, of course, not to dispute the fact that the armed forces of many 
countries have been called upon (and will continue to be called upon) to 
act in situations that are "messy", volatile and dangerous by the standards 
of most traditional peacekeeping operations. The issue explored in this 
article is about the role and utility of military force in responding to such 
situations, and specifically whether the actual experience of "peace 
operations" in the 1990s lends much support to the notion that "peace 
enforcement" can meaningfully be treated as a distinct category of "peace 
support" operations. Three basic difficulties stand out. 5° 
In the first place, the fact that "conflict environments are grey and 
messy" does not automatically suggest that the solution is to locate "peace 
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support operations on a spectrum of force".51 Indeed, by doing so one is 
likely to "encourage the notion that there can be military fixes of deep-
rooted political problems, a notion that may be exacerbated by the pres-
sure for quick exit strategies"." There is, in other words, a danger that 
faith in doctrinal innovation- not unlike faith in technological "fixes" and 
breakthroughs - may obscure the importance of maintaining a firm link 
between the employment of military force and the long-term political 
objective which the use of force is intended to achieve. This very basic 
point goes to the heart of the distinction which Rupert Smith was drawing 
in 1994 between what the use of force and forces can achieve as opposed 
to can do. 
The second difficulty flows from the first: the idea that a "peace 
enforcement" or "peace restoring" operation can clinically apply force to 
manipulate the behaviour of various parties on the ground without desig-
nating an enemy while, at the same time, assuming that such action will 
not influence the political dynamics of the conflict, is seriously to underes-
timate the impact of outside military action on the local balance of military, 
political and economic interests in the kind of complex intra-state conflicts 
we have seen in the 1990s. It presupposes, in effect, a crude psychology 
and highly simplified rationality on the part of the "warring party". It is 
more likely that a warring faction which is militarily and politically disad-
vantaged by the actions of a "peace restoration" or a supposedly impartial 
peace enforcement mission, will take little comfort from not having been 
formally designated an enemy. 53 Similarly, the assurance that military 
action directed against a party will not prejudge the political outcome of 
the conflict, will not have much of an impact if the action itself is not 
linked to a broader political strategy aimed at bringing the conflict to an 
end. In Somalia, Ay deed viewed Boutros-Ghali as a sworn enemy of the 
Habr Gidr, intent upon strengthening the Darod clan at its expense and, to 
this end, using American military might under the guise of a UN operation. 
Boutros-Ghali's past involvement in the region only reinforced local 
suspicions and undermined any claims of impartiality. The fact that 
military action against Ay deed had the direct effect of shifting the local 
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balance of power in favour of his military rivals only confirmed to him and 
his followers that this was "war" and not "peace enforcement". While 
Boutros-Ghali's involvement in Somalia may offer a particularly blatant 
example of partial behaviour, the experience of other operations provides 
little evidence to suggest that "peace enforcement" can in fact be con-
ducted impartially. The case of Somalia also raises the broader issue 
(discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper) of the challenges 
of outside military engagement in "non-Western" societies and cultures, 
where different "rationalities" may be at work, and where the State (in the 
Weberian sense) is either extremely weak or non-existent. 
Finally, those who believe in the feasibility of disinterested and politi-
cally neutral "peace enforcement" may be overestimating the purity of the 
motives of those charged with restoring the peace, while underestimating 
the variety of different motives alluded to above- including power political 
and domestic ones - that influence and constrain governments in their 
decisions regarding the deployment and use of military force. The situation 
in central Bosnia in mid-1993 provides a good illustration of this difficulty. 
Those who have argued in favour of "active impartiality" as a means of 
dealing with violations of agreements and resolutions, often, and with 
good reason, refer to the failure to respond to Bosnian Serb military 
actions against Muslim communities in early 1993 as one instance where 
force should have been used more readily. "Active impartiality" as envis-
aged above, however, would also have required forceful action to be taken 
against Bosnian Croat forces who, with the active support of Croatian 
President, Franjo Tudjman, launched a brutal war against the Bosnian 
Government forces and civilians in Central Bosnia in 1993.54 In a pattern 
of collusion repeated elsewhere, Croat forces in central Bosnia also 
received artillery and other forms of support from the Bosnian Serb 
Army." For a variety of reasons, however, both the American and German 
governments were not prepared to sanction military action against Croat 
forces, even though it was perfectly clear to monitors, observers and 
peacekeepers operating in central Bosnia at the time that regular Croat 
forces, taking their orders directly from Zagreb, were active inside 
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Bosnia.56 This in itself, one might legitimately argue, ought not to have 
prevented forceful action from being taken against Bosnian Serbs. The 
point here is merely that such action would not have amounted to politi-
cally neutral and disinterested "active impartiality". To pretend otherwise 
would have been to disguise a very different reality. 
Another example is provided by Operation Turquoise; France's military 
operation in Rwanda from June to August 1994. This case is of particular 
interest since it apparently inspired the French military to formalise a 
doctrine for "peace restoration" operations. It is also cited in British 
doctrine as the "only peace enforcement operation thus far in which force 
has been used impartially"." While it is clear that public and media pres-
sure for involvement on genuine humanitarian grounds provided part of 
the background to the French government's decision to send a military 
force, the claim that the resulting operation amounted to an "impartial 
peace enforcement" mission is simply not tenable. Indeed, the very 
suggestion that the operation was in some sense "impartial" must appear 
bizarre to observers on the ground at the time, and obscene to those who 
experienced at close quarter the murderous efficiency with which bands 
of interahamwe continued to work within the French-controlled zone. 
Before Operation Turquoise got underway, the French had continued, at 
least until late May 1994, to provide military support to the Forces Armees 
Rwandaises (FAR). It has been established, for example, that although an 
international embargo was imposed against Rwanda on 17 May 1994, at 
least five French shipments of arms were later delivered to the genocidal 
regime." Although the subsequent operation was formally authorised by 
the UN Security Council, Operation Turquoise was in fact far from being 
just a disinterested humanitarian operation. The operation had the effect of 
creating a "safety zone" into which the "Hutu Power" leadership and 
elements of the FAR could and did retreat in large numbers. Indeed, 
according to Me! McNulty, many French soldiers assumed in advance of 
deployment that their "Turquoise brief' implied "a rearguard action in 
support of their beleaguered Rwanda allies, to allow them to retreat in 
good order and regroup". 59 Philip Gourevitch, in his powerful and deeply 
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disturbing account of the genocide, observes how "from the moment they 
[French under Operation Turquoise] arrived, and wherever they went, the 
French forces supported and preserved the same political leaders who had 
presided over the genocide".M' "The signal achievement of the Operation 
Turquoise", Gourevitch concluded, "was to permit the slaughter of Tutsis 
to continue for an extra month, and to secure a passage for the genocidal 
command to cross, with a lot of its weaponry, into Zaire"." Evidence of 
"partiality" rather than "impartiality" has come from a growing number of 
sources and investigations. 62 The report of the international panel set up by 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to investigate the genocide and 
"the surrounding events", released in July 2000, summarises much of the 
evidence that has emerged since 1994.03 While, unlike Gourevitch, it 
accepts and "applauds" that "some 10,000-15,000" were probably saved 
the operation, it also concluded that: 
beyond any doubt, their [French forces] other task was to give support 
to the interim government. Most of the genocidaire regime, large 
numbers of high-ranking military officers, as well as thousands of 
heavily armed interahamwe and the majority of the Rwandan forces 
(now called ex-FARE) managed to escape the RPF advance by retreat-
ing to the convenience of the safe zone. Indeed, France actually 
declared that it would use force against any RPF encroachment on the 
zone. Once it was clear that the RPF could not be halted, however, 
France took the next logical step and facilitated the escape of much of 
the Hutu Power leadership into Zaire."' 
All of this suggests that Operation Turquoise provides a very poor model 
indeed for future operations and, if anything, highlights major difficulties 
with the French concept of "peace restoration". It is simply impossible to 
isolate the dubious short-term "tactical" achievements of Operations 
Turquoise, whatever the admixture motives involved, from that of French 
policy towards the conflict and the region before, during and after the 
genocide. 
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Conclusion: The Use of Force and the Necessity of 
Choice 
If these are some of the painful lessons from the "peace support" opera-
tions in the 1990s, what are the policy implications for the use of force? 
The first point to stress is that to question the notion of "peace enforce-
ment" as a distinct category is not tantamount to opposing enforcement 
per se, and it certainly is not meant to suggest that one should in all 
circumstances seek to revert to the tried and tested practices of past 
peacekeeping operations. On the contrary, it only makes the choice of 
instrumentality starker by stressing that in a number of cases, peacekeep-
ing will not be appropriate and hard decisions regarding the use of force 
will have to be made. By identifying "peace enforcement" as an area of 
activity distinct from war-fighting, one in which "escalation dominance" 
can supposedly be maintained, advocates of the so-called middle-ground 
options, whether intentionally or not, are allowing governments to avoid 
hard decisions about the implications of deploying military personnel. 
While the advocates of "grey area" and "robust" operations usually see 
these as progressive developments from an earlier and more timid ap-
proach, governments, judging from the record of Somalia, Bosnia, and 
elsewhere, tend to see them as a way of limiting involvement, and of 
avoiding the kind of decisions which the nature of the conflict may call 
for. 
The debate on doctrine and the use of force in peace operations was 
not helped by the introduction of the notion of a so-called "Mogadishu 
line". The idea of such a "line" gave the misleading impression, easily shot 
down by critics, that consent was somehow an absolute quality; either 
you possessed it or you did not. Quite clearly consent is not an absolute 
quality, and the aforementioned experience of Australian troops in Somalia 
shows that the margin of consent that does exist in "messy" or "grey" 
operational environments can be enlarged and built upon by an enterprising 
outside force. This is not, however, the same as saying that the basic 
distinction between consent-based operations and enforcement where the 
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logic of war and war-fighting must be accepted, is no longer valid. Asked 
to comment on a draft of the British Peace Support Doctrine in 1997, a 
highly experienced officer observed that "in war, however limited the 
objective or the resources allocated to achieve it, the need to break the will 
of the opponent and to bear the risk to those resources marks the differ-
ence from peace". Recognising this distinction has immediate implications 
which decision-makers will need to think through more carefully than they 
have been prepared to do in recent years. One is forced back, in other 
words, to the question of what the use of force or the threat of its use can 
achieve rather than simply what forces can do. 
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